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A NORTH-SOUTH STRUGGLE: POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC OBSTACLES TO SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
By Jmrana Iqbal * and Charles Pierson**
. INTRODUCTION
o developing countries have a future?1 At least, a futurethat anyone would want to live in? We propose that the
international law of sustainable development can guide
developing countries in their attempts to raise their standard
of living. This assertion comes with a caveat. Despite the cur-
rent trend of linking issues of the environment and economic
development, the developed countries have clung to their histori-
cal tendency of placing economics above concerns over equity
and poverty, and the environment. This Article argues that a
struggle between developed and developing countries explains
the fitful progress towards
global sustainability. The
developed nations pay lip
service to norms of sustain- "The deveioj
able development but com-
pliance remains poor as the correp y-pci
international system has not Ves c nsarr
been given the law-enforce-
ment machinery to compel worldri natu
developed countries to alter
environmentally unfriendly
economic practices.
WHAT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IS AND WHY
IT'S NEEDED
The developing countries aspire to achieve the same level
of economic development and standard of living as developed
countries. The West developed without paying heed to the envi-
ronment. From the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the
second half of the eighteenth century until roughly the 1960s,
developed countries either ignored or were not yet conscious of
environmental concerns. A clean environment became a priority
only after they achieved a certain advanced level of develop-
ment. States of the global South ask why they should not have
the opportunity to follow the same path.2 The developing states
thus assert their right to have their coal and burn it too and to
harvest their tropical rain forests in pursuit of economic growth.3
The South's position has been well articulated in President
Barak Obama's 2013 speech on climate change at Georgetown
University:
Developing countries are using more and more
energy, and tens of millions of people entering a
global middle class naturally want to buy cars and
air-conditioners of their own just like us. Can't blame
them for that. And when you have conversations with
poor countries, they'll say, well, you went through
these stages of development-why can't we?4
The developing countries correctly point out that the West
consumes most of the world's natural resources.5 Therefore, the
West should make a majority of the reductions in natural resource
use. For instance, although it is home to no more than five percent
of the world's population, the United States consumes 25% of the
world's fossil fuels,6 while producing about 14% of global car-
bon emissions.7 Researcher Maggie Black notes the "resentment
from the developing world:
a regime of international
ecological regulation-not in
i"ng countries place during Western industri-
alization-would deny them
S t at the a 'developed' future."8 By
es mo¢t ofthe implementing blocks, there
would be a significant shift
07 resources in the social and economic
inequality between developed
and developing countries. 9
Developing countries think
that the West has reached the top of the ladder of development and
wants to push the ladder out from under poorer states.10
The South has a right to be angry, but emulating the West's
historical path of development is not possible. An estimated
ninety percent of all future population growth is expected to take
place in developing countries which requires a significantly dif-
ferent approach to ensuring a habitable environment as industri-
alization occurs." The concept of sustainable development was
formulated to reconcile the conflict between economic growth
and environmental protection.12 The sustainable development
idea regards both economic growth and environmental protec-
tion as genuine goods. 3 Under sustainable development, growth
is not sacrificed for the environment, nor is the environment
sacrificed for economic growth.i4 By implementing sustainable
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development goals, developing countries can enjoy sustainable
growth while protecting the natural environment.15
Developing states will not abandon development practices
that degrade the environment merely because developed states
exhort them to. These states must commit themselves to chang-
ing their own habits and provide technical and financial assis-
tance to poor states for clean sustainable development. In theory
this concept seems easy; accomplishing this is another story.
This Article begins by tracing the origins and growth of
sustainable development in international conferences and orga-
nizations such as the United Nations ("UN") and in the writ-
ings of scholars (section II). However, the history of sustainable
development has not been one of unqualified success. There
has been extensive state practice of opposition to sustainable
development. Section III focuses on the United States' resis-
tance and obstruction to sustainable development. Lest anyone
incorrectly conclude that it is only the United States that is
opposed to sustainable development, Section IV examines how
the world trading system clashes with sustainable development.
Section V examines structural and other obstacles to sustainable
development
11. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE HISTORY OF AN
EMERGING NORM?
Sustainable development emerged as a new approach
to ensuring economic growth while protecting the environ-
ment with the publication in 1987 of the Brundtland Report.16
Although the law had not been entirely indifferent to the concept
prior to this publication, the Brundtland Report is generally
regarded as setting international environmental law on the path
of sustainable development. 17
The Brundtland Commission rejected the despairing thesis
that environmental problems were past repair, spiraling out of
control, and could only be averted by arresting development and
economic growth: a policy of no growth. Instead, it argued that
economic growth was both desirable and possible within a con-
text of sustainable development."
The current direction of international environmental law
owes much to the definition of sustainable development pre-
sented in the Brundtland Report: "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs."19 The report emphasized
the concepts of "needs," particularly those of the world's poor,
and "limitations" imposed by social organizations and the cur-
rent level of technological development to meet those needs.20
These two concepts of needs and limitations now delineate
international sustainability concerns and provide broad guidance
to encourage state practices for sustainable development in both
developing and developed countries. 21
The Brundtland Report galvanized changes in global policy
objectives. Since the Brundtland Report, the law of sustain-
able development informs international environmental law and
includes within its purview both environmental and develop-
mental issues and their social and economic dimensions, includ-
ing implementation concerns. 22
Following the Brundtland Report, the concept of sustain-
able development appears in several international and national
legal instruments, reflecting concerns that go beyond economic
growth and charting goals that follow a wide range of objec-
tives, including protection of the natural environment, promo-
tion of sustainable economic growth, and achievement of social
development. In 1992, the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), also called the Earth
Summit or the Rio Conference, outlined the profile of sustain-
able development in a set of principles that sought to balance the
priorities of developed and developing countries.
23
According to the Rio Declaration, sustainable development
comprises intergenerational equity (Principle 3); the integra-
tion of environmental protection into the development process
(Principle 4); intragenerational equity24 and the alleviation of
poverty (Principle 5); consideration of countries' special devel-
opment and environmental needs (Principle 6); reduction of
unsustainable production and consumption (Principle 8); reduc-
tions in population (Principle 8); and effective environmental
legislation (Principle 11).
In the years following the Earth Summit, the concept of
sustainable development was sharpened in major UN summits.
Paragraph 6 of the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration, for instance,
features the interconnections between sustainable and social
development:
We are deeply convinced that economic develop-
ment, social development and environmental pro-
tection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing
components of sustainable development, which is
the framework for our efforts to achieve a higher
quality of life for all people .... 25
Paragraph 6 of the Copenhagen Declaration further under-
scores the importance of achieving environmentally sustainable
economic activity through practices that promote social develop-
ment, particularly for the poor.
Equitable social development that recognizes
empowering the poor to utilize environmental
resources sustainably is a necessary foundation for
sustainable development. We also recognize that
broad-based and sustained economic growth in the
context of sustainable development is necessary to
sustain social development and social justice.26
In 1997, the International Court of Justice looked at sus-
tainable development for the first time. Judge Weeramantry
concluded that sustainable development is "a principle with
normative value" whether one looks at "multilateral treaties,
international declarations, the foundation documents of inter-
national organizations, the practices of international financial
institutions, regional declarations and planning documents, or
State practice."
27
A 1999 Seminar of the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), on Social and
Environmental Interfaces, accorded a place of centrality to
the quality of human life now and in the future by seeking to
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promote developmental practices that are socially responsible,
that is, practices which strive to alleviate poverty by ensuring
that basic needs are met.
If the primary goals of environmentally sustain-
able development are freedom from poverty, secure
livelihoods, good health and quality of life, then
socially responsible development has to deal with
such needs as food, basic housing, access to good
water, health care (especially for children and older
members of society), sanitation, education, energy
in the form of fuel, transport, etc.
28
The World Conservation Union concluded that sustainable
development means achieving a standard of living that can be
maintained for many generations. Sustainable development is
socially desirable because it meets people's cultural, material,
and spiritual needs in equitable ways; is economically viable
because it pays for itself; and is ecologically sustainable because
it protects the viability of ecosystems. 29
The broadest and most detailed instrument so far in the
development of the international law norm of sustainable devel-
opment has been Agenda 21 adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit.3
Agenda 21 represents a verbal commitment by nations around
the world to take actions to further sustainable development.3 1
Agenda 21 is a global affirmation of the premise of the Rio
Declaration that the "right of development must be fulfilled so
as to equitably meet the developmental and environmental needs
of present and future generations."3 2 Although non-binding,
Agenda 21 is an action plan for the international community to
integrate environmental and development concerns for a sus-
tainable future. 33 It places the responsibility for implementing
sustainable development principles on governments-of both
developing and developed states-in coordination with the UN,
other international, regional, and sub-regional organizations;
non governmental organizations; and the public. 34 Agenda
21's recommendations and proposals provide an agreed upon
framework for the development and implementation of interna-
tional law and policy related to global sustainable development.
As Professors Birnie and Boyle declare, Agenda 21 manifests
the understanding that sustainable development now "makes a
state's management of its own domestic environment a matter of
international concern in a systematic way."35
THE MILLENNIUM DECLARATION AND MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Scott Wisor, Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study
of Global Ethics at the University of Birmingham, provides
this background:
In the late 1990s, Kofi Annan sought a way to keep
development and poverty eradication on the agenda
in an era of declining concern for global issues. His
answer was the Millennium Declaration, a striking
document ratified by the world's governments that
declared a set of shared values and commitments to
a range of goals, which themselves built on previous
international summits.36
Crafted at the September 2000 UN Millennium Summit, a
third of the Declaration addresses sustainable development and
eradication of poverty.37 The Millennium Declaration calls for
measures including debt relief, "more generous development
assistance," the end of "the unsustainable exploitation of water
resources," passage of the Kyoto Protocol, and reaffirms support
for Agenda 21.38
The Millennium Development Goals ("MDGs"),39 which
followed a year later in Summer 2001, were a "codification of
the Declaration's development related objectives." 40 Scott Wisor
writes: "[d]rafted in the backrooms of the UN by a small number
of high level bureaucrats from several multilateral organizations,
the MDGs were a set of eight goals, each with specific targets
and indicators against which to track the world's progress."
41
Goal 7, "Ensure Environmental Sustainability," explicitly
references sustainable development in its title, but all the MDGs
address matters which scholars now consider to be components
of sustainable development. 42
September 2015 was the deadline for achieving the MDGs.
Doyle and Stiglitz concluded: "[T]he MDG record has been
mixed. Some goals, such as halving the proportion of people
living in extreme poverty, have been met at the global level, but
none have been fulfilled in all countries." 43
POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
Well before the 2015 expiration of the MDGs, the United
Nations began considering what would follow the MDGs.
44
Planning has been taking place under the rubric of the Post-2015
Development Agenda. 45
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development
("Rio+20") held in June 2012 established an intergovernmental
working group, the Open Development Group, to formulate the
unimaginatively named Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
to succeed the 2001 Millennium Development Goals. 46
On July 19, 2014, the Open Development Group released
a draft set of Sustainable Development Goals ("SDGs"). 47
The SDGs cover much of the same ground as the MDGs.48
However, unlike the MDGs, the SDGs divide sustainability
into several goals. 49
EU.S. PFLCTtCE. A J. O 0BIST[ -o OnR 0BsTUC-T
Donald Brown maintains that the United States has con-
sistently blocked global environmental treaty-making efforts
and in doing so relinquished its past position of leadership on
international issues.50 For years, the United States hid behind
a smokescreen of pretended scientific uncertainty over climate
change.Sl The United States argued that scientific evidence does
not justify corrective actions and that too little is known about
the problem of global warming to justify the costs of stabiliz-
ing greenhouse gas emissions. 52 One of the last products of
the Carter Administration was a report from the President's
Council on Environmental Quality urging the government to act
responsibly on climate.5 3 The Reagan Administration ignored
the report.54 Instead, the Reagan Administration (1981-89) mar-
shaled supposed scientific uncertainty to validate its unconcern
over global warming.55
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The U.S. government's unwillingness to adopt a principled
stance on climate change continued into the Administration of
George H. W, Bush (1989-93). During the negotiations on what
was to become the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), 56 the United States-historically the great-
est emitter of greenhouse gases-refused to submit to a formula
that would require it to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas
emissions in proportion with its past contribution to greenhouse
gas buildup.57 Instead, the United States demanded that develop-
ing nations accept responsibility greater than their due share. 58
Owing to this U.S. hardline position, the FCCC contained no
enforceable targets and timetables. 59 Donald Brown writes: "The
United States reluctantly agreed to make a good-faith effort to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000."6o
Additionally, the United States conceded that developed nations
should make progress in reducing emissions before expecting
commitments from the developing world.61 Even these watered-
down assurances succumbed to Congress' fierce resistance,
impelled by coal and petroleum industry lobbying groups.
This course of inaction continued during the Clinton
Administration, which, despite its own inclination to act more
conscientiously, found itself helpless before a hostile Congress.
62
In 1995, the new IPCC report concluded that it was now possible
to discern the human-induced climate change. 63 Thereafter, the
Clinton Administration expressed subdued willingness to accept
internationally enforceable targets and binding national emis-
sions reductions timetables. 64 These were negotiated in Kyoto,
Japan in 1997.65
Negotiations at Kyoto were tense. Congress exerted its
weight to impede agreement on the principle of "common but dif-
ferentiated commitments and responsibilities." 66 The international
community, by contrast, clamored for the United States to make
a meaningful and legally binding pledge to reduce its emissions
levels.6 7 The United States finally agreed to a 7% reduction below
1990 levels by 2008-2012 while other nations agreed to the United
States' proposed "flexibility mechanisms." 68 Yet, after Kyoto, the
Clinton Administration announced that it would not seek ratifi-
cation of the Kyoto Protocol until "China and other developing
nations agreed to limit their emissions, something that they had
objected to doing before the developed world acted. ' 69
The Administration of President George W Bush (2001-09)
achieved a new low in shunning responsible action on climate
change. The Bush Administration pressured federal agencies and
scientists working for the federal government to exaggerate the
degree of uncertainty over the existence of anthropogenic climate
change. 70 The Bush Administration also trotted out other old
excuses: cost to the American economy in terms of lost jobs and
reduced GDP71 and the failure of the developing world to make
commitments. 72 In 2001, the Bush Administration renounced
the Kyoto Protocol, regarding it as inimical to U.S. economic
interests.73 Later, in the same year, when a National Academy
of Sciences report confirmed that global warming was getting
worse, President Bush acknowledged the report but insisted that
there was too much scientific uncertainty to justify the economic
costs of committed action.74 In this President Bush proved him-
self the faithful servant of coal and petroleum groups. 75
George W Bush did not deny the reality of climate change;
he merely did nothing about the problem. 76 In April 2008, with
less than a year remaining before he would leave office, Bush
proposed his boldest climate initiative: voluntary caps.77 "[T]
here is a wrong way and a right way to approach reducing green-
house gas emissions," Bush said, not adding that he was commit-
ted to the wrong way.7
8
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, 2009 TO THE PRESENT
The environmental movement had great hopes for Barack
Obama. 79 During his 2008 Presidential campaign, candidate
Obama promised to make addressing climate change a priority;
80
however, President Obama has consistently disappointed envi-
ronmentalists. Disillusion with Obama set in early. December
2009 saw the Copenhagen Climate Conference. Copenhagen
resulted in what Naomi Klein calls a "pitiful deal." 81 Under the
Copenhagen Accord, Klein writes:
the major polluting governments-including the
United States and China-signed a non-binding
agreement to keep temperatures from increasing
more than 2 degrees Celsius above where they
were before we started powering our economies
with coal. 82
The trouble is, keeping world temperatures below 2'C
is onlythe bare minimum threshold for preventing runaway
warming.83 2'C represents a tipping point beyond which rap-
idly rising temperatures are irreversible. 84 We aren't at 20C yet,
but even if the world does not break through the 2'C ceiling,
our planet will likely experience a catastrophic rise in sea lev-
els which will inundate major cities from Mumbai to Miami.85
Millions of human beings are already living in a post 20C world
of rising tides, dying crops, and more and more record hot
days. 86 The climate groups who attended Copenhagen hoped to
limit world temperature rise to no more than 1.50C. 87 Instead,
environmental activist Bill McKibben estimates that the "com-
mitments" made at Copenhagen will result in a devastating 3C
temperature increase. 88
Environmental groups had also hoped that the attendees at
Copenhagen would agree to cuts in world carbon emissions of
80% by 2050, but that goal was eliminated from the final agree-
ment.89 The United States pledged to reduce carbon emissions
by only 17% below 2005 levels by 2020.90 The emissions cuts
were to have been achieved by a cap-and-trade plan, part of the
ill-fated Waxman-Markey bill.91 Under cap and trade, trad-
able "carbon credits"-permits to pollute-would be assigned
to corporate polluters in the United States.92 A polluter could
obtain additional credits by purchasing from other polluters or
by participating in "offsets": projects, such as planting trees,
which would soak up carbon in the atmosphere. 93 In theory, cap
and trade would raise the cost of emissions to corporate polluters
and spur development of renewable alternatives. 94
The bill passed the House of Representatives, 219-212.95
However, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D), decided not
Spring 2016
to introduce Waxman-Markey into the Senate because Reid
calculated that there were insufficient votes there for the bill to
pass.96 By late July 2010, Waxman-Markey was dead. 97
Waxman-Markey failed even though it was a strongly pro-
corporate bill.98 Waxman-Markey "[gave] billions of dollars in
handouts to fossil fuel companies and practically a license to
print money from carbon offsets and credits." 99 Trading of car-
bon credits promised a bonanza for Wall Street traders.
Cap-and-trade failed, but Obama did not abandon the
goal of reining in carbon emissions. Speaking at Georgetown
University on June 25, 2013, President Obama announced a
major new initiative to address climate change. 100 Obama pro-
posed setting federal limits on carbon emissions on both new
and existing coal-fired power plants, which would cut 2005
emissions levels 30% by 2020.101 He promised that the cuts
would not sacrifice strong economic growth and job creation. 102
The Clean Power Plan, as it is called, has met strong Republican
opposition and resulted in two pending federal lawsuits: West
Virginia v. EPA103 and Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA. 1°4
One significant success for the President is the November
2014 bilateral carbon agreement with China.10 5 The United
States and China produce 45% of the world's GHG emissions. 10 6
China does much of its polluting on behalf of U.S. businesses.
Much of China's emissions
come from factories owned
by U.S. corporations operat- "Curbing China
ing in China, such as General
Electric, General Motors, will be impossib
Apple, Johnson Controls,
and Caterpillar. 10 7 Thanks to in US. c
outsourcing, U.S. corpora-
tions now vicariously pol-
lute in China. 10 8 By shifting its emissions overseas, the United
States gets to take credit for cutting its carbon emissions more
than it actually has.'09 Curbing China's carbon emissions will
be impossible without reigning in U.S. corporations.110 The
two countries agreed to jointly reduce their GHG emissions. 111
The US will cut its emissions 26% to 28% below 2005 levels
by 2025,112 while China pledges that its emissions will cease to
grow by 2030.113 However, it should be noted that the agreement
is non-binding. 114
Much less successful was the Paris Climate Summit held
from November 30, 2015 to December 11, 2015. 115 In a different
world, a binding international agreement to cut greenhouse gas
emissions would have come out of the Paris Summit Each of
the more than 190 countries participating submitted an Intended
Nationally Determined Contribution ("INDC"), setting out the
amount by which each nation was willing to cut its greenhouse
gas emissions.116 The United States submitted an INDC promis-
ing to cut GHG emissions nearly 30% from 2005 levels by the
year 2025.117
The process had two fatal flaws. The first is arithmetical. The
2015 Paris Summit had the same goal as the 2009 Copenhagen
Climate Summit ("COP 15"): to prevent average tempera-
tures from rising more than 2°C from where they stood at the
S C
'le
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beginning of the Industrial Revolution.1 18 But the participating
states' commitments did not add up. Even if all 1NDCs were faith-
fully adhered to (a huge "if"), global temperatures would increase
to approximately 3C by the end of the century.1 9 The second
fatal flaw is that the Paris Accord, like the Copenhagen Accord
before it, is non-binding. 120 "A fraud" is how former NASA sci-
entist and climate change pioneer James Hansen summed up the
Paris Summit. 12 1
1Vo DOES TRADE TRUMP ENVIRONMENT?
Professor Philippe Sands has remarked that there are two
principal challenges to the development of international sustain-
able development law. 122 The first is to develop rules that recognize
"the need to reconcile the inherent and fundamental interde-
pendence of the world environment with the sovereign world of
independent states." 123 The second challenge is "defin[ing] the
relationship between international environmental law and other
areas of international law, particularly in the economic and social
domain." 124 This section attempts to address the second challenge.
We argue that there is a very simple relationship between interna-
tional environmental law and the economic domain, specifically
international trade law. When trade clashes with environmental
protection, trade always trumps environment. 12
Tariffs are not the only
barriers to free trade. 126
arbon emissions There are also non-tariff bar-
riers (NTBs), including, but
vihout reigning not limited to, import quotas,
import licensing, subsidies,
and restrictions on goods'
distribution and sale.127 Like
tariffs, NTBs are regarded
as protectionist.12 Disastrously for the environment, free trade
regimes too often treat states' attempts to protect the environ-
ment as covert protectionism. 129 The idea is that a state may
enact a measure on the ostensible grounds that it is designed to
protect the environment when the actual aim is to benefit domes-
tic producers at the expense of imports. 130 On occasion, this is a
fair criticism. 13
1
We can see trade trumping environmental protection in the
latest free trade pact, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade and
Globalization Agreement (TPP). The TPP has been described
as "NAFTA on steroids.'132 The TPP will include twelve Pacific
Rim countries representing 40% of global GDP.133 The text of
the agreement was finally made public on November 5, 2015.134
Up to that time, the text of the TPP was wrapped in the sort of
secrecy surrounding plans for military invasions. 13 5 The general
public would have remained in the dark about the TPP's contents
if Wikileaks had not leaked portions of the text.136
The TPP states as an objective to "promote high levels of
environmental protection and effective enforcement of environ-
mental laws." '137 That's the promise; what's the reality? An earlier
draft of the TPP contained an article on climate change.13 8 But
the final text makes no reference to climate change. 139 As with
NAFTA, the TPP's environmental guarantees lack teeth. 140 As if to
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dispel any doubt of this, TPP contains an article titled, "Voluntary
Mechanisms to Enhance Environmental Performance."
141
Where we do find teeth is in the TPP's investor protec-
tion provisions which the TPP's drafters have set out in loving
detail. Under the TPP, alleged violations of investor protection
are subject to Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). 142
ISDS empower foreign investors, chiefly multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs), to pursue arbitration against states for damages
resulting from violation of any of the TPP's investor protection
provisions. 143 Disputes are heard before supranational arbitral
tribunals, bypassing national courts. 144 Damages, when awarded,
come out of the pockets of the host nation's taxpayers. 1
45
The Trans-Pacific Partnership contains four principal investor
protection provisions addressing expropriation, fair and equitable
treatment, national treatment and most favored nation status.
EXPROPRIATION 1
46
A foreign investor may recover damages for direct or indi-
rect expropriation of its property, including lost profits.1 47 The
most obvious instance of direct expropriation is nationaliza-
tion. 148 However, it is indirect expropriation that is more likely
to disrupt environmental regulations directed at climate change
mitigation. 149 Indirect expropriation is defined broadly in the
TPP 15 0 Any environmental regulation that impinges on an inves-
tor's profits or reduces the value of the investor's property or
investments may conceivably be challenged as an indirect expro-
priation.151 Thus, an investor may claim that an environmental
protection regulation diminishes the value of its investment or
property. For instance, rising sea levels caused by warming may
prompt bans on building on coastlines.152 A setback regulation
of this sort could conceivably be challenged as an indirect expro-
priation by a foreign-owned hotel chain planning to build a hotel
near the ocean.153 A recent example of an indirect expropria-
tion claim comes from Germany. After the devastating nuclear
meltdown in Fukushima, Japan in 2011, Germany decided to
phase out its nuclear reactors. 15 4 Germany's decision is being
challenged as an indirect expropriation by the Swedish energy
giant Vattenfall. 155
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (FET)156
States are required to accord foreign investors a minimum
standard of fair treatment.157 What does this mean? That's hard
to say.158 Answering is complicated by the fact that some WTO
panels see FET as a rising bar which demands more of host
countries over time. 159 Another difficulty FET puts in the way
for environmental protection is the finding of some tribunals
that FET requires safeguarding a foreign investor's "legitimate
expectations" of profit.160 "In its most expansive form," Wilensky
writes, "the principle of legitimate expectations has been inter-
preted to require a stable [i.e., unchanging] legal and business
framework."161 The petitioner in Tecmed operated a hazardous
waste facility under a one-year permit from the Mexican govern-
ment.162 Mexico was held liable when it refused to renew the
permit for the hazardous waste facility even though Mexico
cited public health concerns as the reason for its decision.1 63
Other tribunals have required an express promise from the
host state made with the intention of inducing the investor's
reliance. 164 Other tribunals have only required that the investor
reasonably rely on representations made by the host country
regardless of the host country's intent.165 In reality, all these
approaches turn what the law ought to be upside down. An inves-
tor who does not expect states to take steps to address climate
change is the one acting unreasonably. 166
NONDISCRIMINATION
The final two investor protections both guarantee that a host
state will not discriminate against foreign investors. 167 Under the
National Treatment obligation a host country is not permitted to
treat its own investors more favorably than foreign investors. 168
Under the Most Favored Nation obligation (MFN), a host coun-
try must treat all foreign investors alike.1
69
Any critic of free trade agreements must come to grips with
one apparently strong objection. If free trade agreements are so
damaging to the environment why have there been so few ISDS
challenges to U.S. environmental laws, and even fewer success-
ful challenges? 170 President Obama himself called attention to
this fact while he was promoting passage of the TPP 171 In a con-
ference call with news reporters on April 24, 2015, the President
said that the United States was party to over 3,000 international
agreements containing ISDS provisions and that "[u]nder
these various ISDS provisions, the U.S. has been sued a total
of 17 times. Thirteen of those cases have been decided so far.
We've won them all. They have no ability to undo U.S. laws.
172
Obama's last sentence is technically correct, but is misleading. If
a host state loses a challenge to one of its environmental laws, it
is likely to abandon that law rather than pay further damages (in
the case of the TPP or NAFTA) or face trade sanctions (under
the WTO). 173 After the WTO Appellate Body ruling against the
United States in the Venezuela Gas Dispute, the US rewrote its
standards for imported gasoline rather than pay Venezuela an
annual $150 million in fines. 174
Ontario removed the local content provisions from its Green
Energy and Green Economy Act after the provisions were suc-
cessfully challenged before the WTO. 175 In a third example,
the U.S. Congress is poised to abandon country-of-origin meat
labeling after the WTO held that the labeling requirement dis-
criminates against livestock from Canada and Mexico. 176
The very first dispute brought to the WTO involved envi-
ronmental pollution. In the Venezuela Gas dispute,1 77 Venezuela
challenged an EPA regulation that required imported gasoline
to meet stricter pollution standards than gasoline from U.S.
producers. 178 Venezuela alleged that this was discrimination in
violation of GATT's national treatment obligation. The United
States, however, argued that clean air was an exhaustible natural
resource; thus, the anti-pollution EPA Gasoline Rule fell under
an exception to GATT's national treatment obligation: GATT
Article XX(g) relating to conservation of natural resources. 179
The DSB agreed with the United States that clean air was
an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of GATT
Article XX(g),180 a holding which the Appellate Body did not
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disturb. However, the Appellate Body said that the EPA Gasoline
Rule was not permitted under the Article XX(g) exception
because the United States could have chosen non-discriminatory
means of preserving air quality.181 The United States subse-
quently changed the EPA Rule in order to make it consistent
with GATT.182 The perverse result brought about by the WTO
decision was that Venezuela was allowed to sell dirtier gasoline
in the United States after the WTO decision than it had before
the decision.1 83
The WTO Agreement does not contain an ISDS feature.184
However, investors can still take action against states indi-
rectly. 185 An aggrieved investor can persuade his or her home
country to bring an action in the WTO.186 The result will be trade
sanctions, not an award of damages to the investor. The host
country will be motivated to lift the complained of restriction
in order to avoid sanctions. 187 So, President Obama is correct
that the United States has not lost ISDS challenges. However, the
United States has lost challenges before the WTO.1 8  NAFTA,
GATT, and TTP provide most of the same trade protections.1 89
In our opinion, all three of these agreements are relevant to
assessing the vulnerability of environmental protection laws to
challenges utilizing ISDS.
The ISDS winning streak enjoyed by the United States
may come to an end. On February 23, 2016190 President Obama
vetoed the Keystone Pipeline Approval Act.191 The proposed
Keystone XL oil pipeline has been contentious because envi-
ronmentalists contend the pipeline would do severe harm to the
environment. 19 2 On January 6, 2016, TransCanada, the company
contracted to construct and operate the pipeline, filed a chal-
lenge against the United States under NAFTA. 193 TransCanada
alleged that the cancellation of Keystone XL breached United
States' obligations under NAFTA Article 1102 (National
Treatment), Article 1103 (Most-Favored-Nation Treatment),
Article 1105 (Minimum Standard of Treatment), Article 1110
(Expropriation).194 TransCanada alleges that the United States
rejected the Keystone application for political reasons, not envi-
ronmental considerations. 195 The United States had approved
three similar oil pipelines while TransCanada's application was
pending. 196 In addition, several federal environmental impact
reviews had all concluded that the Keystone pipeline would
not cause significant damage to the natural environment. 197 If
TransCanada prevails in its suit, it will provide ammunition for
attacking other state measures to mitigate climate change.
RENEWABLES
To establish a low-carbon economy, use of high-carbon fos-
sils fuels must give way to renewable energy sources such as
wind and solar. The first dispute on renewable energy to come
before the WTO involved the Canadian province of Ontario. 198 In
2009, the Ontario enacted a Green Energy and Green Economy
Act. 199 This "climate action plan" was meant to encourage the
growth of renewables, such as wind and solar, and get Ontario,
"Canada's most populous province completely off coal by
2014.200 Under the Act, producers of renewable energy would
be entitled to sell to Ontario at guaranteed premium prices under
long-term contracts, an arrangement known as a "feed-in tar-
iff" ("FIT Program"). 20 1 To qualify for the subsidies, producers
must meet local content requirements (LCRs) for materials and
services.202 The local content requirements are intended to spur
employment in the province.2 3 Not just business corporations,
but "local municipalities, co-ops, and Indigenous communities"
are encouraged to participate.
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The WTO Appellate Body held the local content require-
ments to be inconsistent with national treatment. 20 5 "National
treatment" forbids a host nation from giving preferential treatment
to "goods produced by local companies and goods produced [in
the host nation] by foreign firms."2 0 6 The FIT Program's Minimum
Required Domestic Content Levels were a subsidy available only
to producers (foreign or domestic) operating in Ontario. 20 7 The
Appellate Body held that a subsidy offered under these conditions
is discriminatory and inconsistent with the national treatment
provisions of GATT 1994 and the TRIMs Agreement.208 Ontario
removed the local content requirement so as to comply with the
WTO decision.2 9 Ontario also cancelled the feed-in tariff for most
projects.210 The authors draw this conclusion from the Appellate
Body's decision: a host state cannot promote the growth of renew-
able energy through subsidies available only to its own citizens.
This restriction may hobble measures to promote renewables.
Without the promise of Green Jobs, initiatives like Ontario's may
not be politically feasible,2 11 and local content rules are necessary
if Green Jobs are to be created. 2
12
Local content rules-or, rather, their analog: domestic con-
tent rules were the subject of a recently decided challenge by the
United States against India.213 In August 2015, a WTO dispute
settlement panel ruled that the domestic content requirements
(DCR) attached to India's Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar
Mission violated national treatment.214 India required that solar
cells and solar modules (and, later, thin film technologies) be man-
ufactured in India.2 15 The same sort of LCR had been successfully
challenged in Ontario by Japan and the European Union.216
ILLEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
Legitimate expectations claims derive from the FET obliga-
tion. Environmental lawyer Meredith Wilensky writes:
In the context of climate change, [legitimate expec-
tations] claims are particularly concerning because
where climate regulators increase costs or frustrate
investments, foreign investors may argue that the
regulations violate their legitimate expectations
of profit. For example, such suits may arise where
emissions standards result in early retirement of
coal-fired power plants because they are unable to
achieve newly imposed GHG emissions standards.
If such a claim is successful, a host state would be
required to compensate the investor for the expected
profits had the plant continued to operate.2 17
As an example of how the sort of lost profits claims Wilensky
has in mind may frustrate regulations meant to address climate
change, consider the following troubling scenario. The Obama
Administration's Clean Power Plan, discussed above, 218 will
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require carbon emissions cuts at existing coal-burning electricity
generating plants throughout the United States.2 19 In Kentucky
alone there are 57 such units located in 21 plants. 220 Two firms
own sixteen of these units: Kentucky Utilities Company and
Louisville Gas & Electric.22 1 These two companies are owned
by German energy giant E.ON AG.222 Germany is one of the
countries currently negotiating TPP's clone, the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) which will apply to the
US and Europe in the same way as the TPP applies to the Pacific
Rim countries.22 3 Assume that the TTIP contains the same inves-
tor protections as the TPP, including the FET obligation (a fair
assumption). Assume further that the Clean Power Plan not only
cuts emissions from coal-burning power plants, but, in doing so,
cuts into coal plants' profits. Under those circumstances, will E
ON AG be able to challenge the Clean Power Plan on the grounds
that it deprives E ON AG of its legitimate expectations of profit
in running its US plants and thus is inconsistent with the TTIP's
FET obligation? The answer may hinge on how Vattenfall's
arbitration against Germany resolves. If Germany does not have
the right to shutter nuclear plants in Germany, even given the
very strong health and safety concerns involved, why should the
Clean Power Plan be allowed to cut into the profits (or force the
closing) of coal plants in the United States?
DEFENDING ISDS
Scholarly attempts are sometimes made to argue that inter-
national trade regimes do not threaten environmental protec-
tion.224 Dr. Alhaji B. M. Marong points out that the U.S. Congress
enacted NAFTA only after "side agreements" on labor and the
environment were concluded. 225 He does not mention that these
side agreements have no teeth-no enforcement mechanisms. 226
The TPP does contain a carve-out for environmental and health
regulations in Article 9.15.227 However, Article 9.15 requires
that health and environmental regulations be "consistent with"
the TPP's Investment Chapter which contains the investor pro-
tections we have been discussing.228 The investor protections of
TPP's Investment Chapter trump regulations meant to protect the
environment and human health.229
Marong also cites favorable mentions of sustainable
development made in ministerial meetings of the WTO.230 He
emphasizes that the WTO has established two bodies to consider
environmental and development concerns.23 1 Yet, writing in
2003, Marong is forced to acknowledge the "less than satisfac-
tory progress in international trade regimes, vis-d-vis environ-
mental protections and sustainable development" although this
admission does not prevent him from concluding that the points
he has raised "do show that there is some movement towards the
integration of economic and non-economic concerns." 232
REMEDIES
Meredith Wilensky contends that simple revisions to the
TPP can make the agreement effective in protecting the environ-
ment.233 We agree. She suggests that an environmental exception
clause be added for good faith environmental regulations. 234 She
also suggests the addition of a provision to allow compliance
with environmental treaties.2 35 The present authors suggest the
following reform: delegations negotiating free trade agreements
should include representatives from environmental NGOs and
labor unions. NGOs and other non-state actors are routinely
present at UN environmental conferences.2 36 Their presence
makes it much more likely that their views will be part of the
resulting declarations, development goals, and treaties. 237 At
present, the only "NGOs" who have the ear of trade negotiators
are multinational corporations. How much different or better
would the TPP be if members of the AFL-CIO and the Sierra
Club had been at the negotiating table?
Reforms such as these may prevent trade from trumping
environmental protection.
V. OTHER OBSTACLES TO THE FORMATION OF A
NORM OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
A. STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES
Structural impediments-technological and scientific-
to sustainable development plague the developing world.238
Inducing developing nations to pursue sustainable development
is challenging because developing countries are "beset by basic
economic, social, and political problems that appear to many of
their residents and government leaders more urgent than environ-
mental concerns." 239 These include armed conflict,240 exploding
populations, and dwindling natural resources. Such enormous
challenges make the goals of conservation and pollution reduc-
tion less critical than the immediate 24 1 problem of survival. 24
2
Today's urgent needs overwhelm planning for the future,243 even
though when developing countries do want to implement sustain-
able development most of these countries simply lack the needed
regulatory infrastructure. 244 Developing nations typically have
few resources, including money, to mitigate the effects of envi-
ronmental degradation, such as ozone depletion, water pollution,
or climate change. 245 Developed countries, on the other hand,
are able to cushion the negative effects of temperature increases
such as rising sea levels.24
6
Additionally, the goals of sustainable development are not
well served by the poor example set by the developed world.2 47
Researcher Maggie Black observes:
[T]he North's dilatory efforts to regulate energy
consumption, particularly US reluctance to take
climate change seriously, does little to encourage
Southern governments to control carbon emissions
or conserve natural resources.248
B. NORMATIVE UNCERTAINTY
Some commentators ascribe the difficulty in implement-
ing sustainable development to normative uncertainty.249 In
this view, sustainable development is simply too amorphous
for states to implement. Sustainable development lacks clear
parameters and criteria which can be used to measure whether
any particular activity is sustainable.25 0 This uncertainty is
apparent in the conflicting meanings which states attach to fun-
damental terms in the sustainable development discourse such
as intergenerational equity, sustainable use, intragenerational
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equity25 1 and integration of environmental, economic, social,
and other considerations. 25 2 If only all actors would agree to use
these terms in the same way, then everyone would be moving in
the same direction and in time we would all arrive together at
the Promised Land of sustainability. Maggie Black captures the
deficiency of this argument:
The proliferating international circus-the confer-
ences, summits, commissions, and their magiste-
rial inquiries into the state of the world's this or
that-too often imply that, if only the world can
reach consensus around key policy principles, the
obstacles to development will crumble. * * * They
have a tendency to describe what needs to be done
about forests, nutrition, child prostitution, dams,
mining, or public health as if its articulation could
bring about ajfait accompli.253
Black is rightly dismissive of is the notion that the world
needs to formulate a new, better definition of sustainable devel-
opment or come up with
the right set of sustainable
development goals or targets.
States have spent the past 'The South ask
forty-five years fleshing out le1s greenhouw
the content of sustainable
development in treaties, less non-ree
declarations, resolutions, and
reports. 254 . Part of this work particularly fossi
of normative clarification fu a nd techne
has consisted in parsing the f
broad concept of sustain- that the Sou
able development into its
constituent elements, e.g.,
inter- and intragenerational
equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, the precau-
tionary principle, etc.255 The content of sustainable development
becomes less uncertain with each passing year. 256
So states do know what the terms of the sustainable develop-
ment discourse mean. More importantly, we contend that states
know what the states which disagree with them mean by these
terms. There are not 190 different meanings given to "sustain-
able use," "intragenerational equity," etc., one for each country
in the world. Instead, the North has one understanding of what
needs to be done and that conflicts with what the South believes
has to be done. What prevents sustainable development isn't
failure to communicate. The North understands perfectly well
what the South wants from it. The South asks the North to emit
less greenhouse gases, consume less non-renewable resources,
particularly fossil fuels, and transfer funds and technology to the
South so that the South can develop. The North simply refuses
to-thus, the position taken in this article that a struggle between
North and South explains the fitful progress towards global
sustainability.
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C. A FUNDAMENTAL CLASH BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH
ON INTRAGENERATIONAL EQUITY
In particular, North and South attach sharply opposed
meanings to the concept of intragenerational equity. The North
understands what the South means by intragenerational equity,
and the South understands what the North means. Yet North and
South have been unable to resolve their disagreement.
The North insists that the South must conserve resources,
emit less carbon, and limit its population growth. The South's
rejoinder is that such measures are unnecessary because as per
capita income increases, environmental quality improves after
a period of increasing environmental degradation. 25 7 Focus on
economic development and the environment will look after
itself.25 8 The South's argument is encouraging, optimistic, and
wrong. The reality is that as environmental amenities in the
form of environmental legislation and institutions to support and
enforce them become affordable, the inverted-U shape relation-
ship described by the environmental Kuznets curve holds good
only with respect to some,
not all, environmental prob-
lems. 259 It does not "appl[y]
the North to emit to environmental quality
generally. '260 There will be
gases, consume improvement with respect to
''a selected set of pollutants
able resources,, only," ones with "local short-
(uels, and transfer term costs," such as "sulfur,particulates, and local coli-
ogy to the South so forms. '261 The curve is not
valid for "the accumulation
cas develo of stocks of waste or for pol-
lutants involving long-term
and more dispersed costs
(such as C02).'2 62 Nor does
this purported mathematical relationship give us any reason to
believe that indefinite economic growth is possible.263 Instead,
overdrawing from the earth's limited resource stocks can irre-
versibly damage its productive capacities, risking the economic
activity itself.264 Yet, clearly, the poverty of most developing
countries does not justify blanket no-growth policies either.2 65
These countries desperately need economic development.
While the rosy argument of the developing countries is
empirically flawed, the position of the developed countries is
flawed ethically. Here we confront the problem of intragenera-
tional equity. Rather than curb its own environmental excesses,
the developed world prefers policies, which place the burden
of environmental protection on the already overburdened
developing nations. 266 The developed countries seek to impose
restrictions on the poor countries' use of their natural resources;
expansion of their industrial base, and growth of their popula-
tions.267 These policies keep the world's poor countries poor.2 68
The South sees these policies as rooted in the same pursuit of
dominance that has historically given rise to Western colonial-
ism, economic exploitation, and economically-motivated
military interventions. 269 It is small wonder that the South sees
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environmentalism as just the latest in a long string of Northern
tactics to keep the South down.
Intragenerational equity is also implicated in Northern
demands with respect to population growth in the South. The
North demands that the South reduce its population without the
North offering reciprocal commitments to reduced consumption,
equitable distribution of wealth and resources, and provision
of developmental assistance to the countries of the South.270
Developing countries resent
the fact that the developed
countries do not attach the
same importance that the "The human ra
developing countries do to to spew carbc
issues related to poverty,
such as polluted water, air the atmospher
pollution in urban areas, and
erosion of topsoil.271  resources, a
Inequity is also apparent
in the ways the North saps population grow
the South's resources. One
way is through expanding the
definition of the global commons. The global commons used to
be limited to earth's atmosphere, oceans, Antarctica, and Outer
Space. 272 More recently, the North has redefined the global com-
mons to also include tropical rain forests and biodiversity.273 The
developing countries rightly regard the expansion of the global
commons as a means to encroach on the South's sovereign
right to the use of its own natural resources. 274 The North con-
tinues to formulate ingenious new ways of stealing the South's
resources.
275
In international negotiations, the George W. Bush
Administration dug in its heels over the need for the United States
to reduce its carbon emissions, arguing that China and India
must do so to the same degree. 276 Not surprisingly, the North
and South have diametrically opposed views on what fairness
requires.277 The Bush Administration argued that it was only fair
that all countries observe the same standards. 27' Readers will be
forgiven for thinking that this was merely a stratagem for the
Bush Administration to avoid cutting U.S. emissions..
Sincere or not, Bush's understanding of fairness was flawed.
Economically, the developing countries have long lagged behind
the West. For many years, the United States has consumed a
ce
)n c
"e,d
nd
tht
disproportionate share of the world's oil, other natural resources,
and the atmosphere's carbon sink.279 Since the industrialized
countries have consumed the lion's share of the world's resources
for so long it would not be fair to expect North and South to
cut back equally. The point is illustrated by a hypothetical
proposed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist
Lester Thurow.2 ° Thurow posits a footrace where half of the
runners are burdened with heavy weights. 21 Even if the runners
are relieved of their weights
midway through the race that
does not transform the race
,annot continue into a fair one.28 2 The race
~missions into only becomes fair when thepreviously burdened runners
teplete natural are allowed to catch up with
those in the lead. 283 It is the
allow global same with the developed and
developing countries. Petergo unchecked. Singer concludes that fairness
demands that the developed
countries should shoulder the
burden of the heaviest cut-backs in carbon emissions.28 4 In fact,
the developed countries had agreed to do just that in the 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
V1. CONCLUSION
Despite general acceptance of the principles of sustainable
development, the countries of the global North have remained
unmotivated to forgo excessive economic self-interest. A vast,
perhaps unbridgeable, divide separates the priorities of the North
and the South. As intensely debated during negotiations at Rio in
1992, the South wants the North to curb its consumption, curb
its emissions, place intragenerational equity above intergenera-
tional equity, and ensure food security and access to fresh water.
In contrast, the North expects the South to limit its population
and forgo development in the name of sustainability.
We all know what needs to be done. The human race cannot
continue to spew carbon emissions into the atmosphere, deplete
natural resources, and allow global population growth to go
unchecked. The problem is getting the international community,
particularly the United States, to make concessions and sacri-
fices. But no one has figured out how to compel states to do so.
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